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Abstract. On March 11, 2011 the strongest ever recorded in Japan earthquake occurred which 
triggered a powerful tsunami and caused a nuclear accident in Fukushima nuclear plant. The 
later was a “man-made” disaster having immense impacts on people’s life, health and property, 
infrastructure, supply chains, economy, policies, natural and institutional environment, etc. 
This paper assesses preparedness for and agri-food impacts of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, 
identifies challenges in post-disaster recovery, and withdraws lessons for improving disaster 
risk management. Japan was not well prepared for such huge disaster while agri-food sector 
and consumption have been among the worst hit areas. The triple disaster was a rare but a high 
impact event, therefore, it is necessary to “prepare for unexpected”. Risk assessment is to 
include diverse hazards and multiple effects of a likely disaster, it is to be discussed with all 
stakeholders, and measures taken to educate and train all for complex disasters. It is necessary 
to modernize property rights, regulations, safety standards, and norms, enhance capability of 
responsible public authorities and improve coordination between divers actors. It is important 
to set up mechanisms for effective public resource allocation and reduction of agents’ costs. 
Different elements of agri-food chain have dissimilar capability requiring differential public 
support. There is a strong “regional” interdependency of agrarian, food and rural assets (and 
damages), and it is important to properly locate risk and take prevention and recover measures. 
Disaster response demonstrated the important role of small scale farms and food organizations, 
and high efficiency of private, market and collective governance. Before, during and after a 
disaster all available information from all sources is to be immediately publicized in 
understandable form through all possible means. Disaster provides opportunity to discuss, 
introduce and implement fundamental changes in agricultural, economic, regional, energy, 
disaster management, etc. policies. It is important to learn from the past experiences and make 
sure that “lessons learned” are not forgotten. 
Keywords. Fukushima, nuclear accident, agri-food impact, risk management  
1. Introduction 
On March 11, 2011 a mega thrust undersea earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 Megawatt (Mw) 
occurred off the Pacific coast of Japan widely known as the Great East Japan Earthquake 
(GEJE). The earthquake was the most powerful earthquake ever recorded in or around Japan, 
and the fourth most powerful earthquake in the world since 1900 [Japan Meteorological 
Agency, 2013]. GEJE triggered powerful tsunamis and a coastal area surpassing 400 km was 
hit by tsunami higher than 10 m that submerged plane areas more than 5 km inland (Picture 1). 
The earthquake and the tsunami caused a nuclear accident in one of the world’s biggest nuclear 
power stations - the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Fukushima prefecture (Picture 
2). The tsunami arrived at the plant station around 50 minutes after the initial earthquake as the 
14-meter-high tsunami overwhelmed the plant's seawalls and damaged cooling and control 
systems. Three out of the six reactors suffered large explosions and level 7 meltdowns occurred 
leading to releases of huge radioactivity into the environment [Nuclear Regulation Authority, 
2014]. Radioactive contamination from the nuclear plant has spread in the region and beyond 
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though air, rains, dust, water circulations, wildlife, garbage disposals, transportation, and 
affected soils, waters, plants, animals, infrastructure, and population.  
Picture 1. Tsunami caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake, March 2011 
 
Picture 2. Nuclear Disaster at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, March 2011 
 
The Fukushima nuclear accident has been having immense impacts on people’s life, health and 
property, social infrastructure, economy, policies, natural and institutional environment, etc. in 
the affected regions, Japan, and beyond [Akiyama et al., 2012; Al-Badri and Berends, 2013; 
Bachev, 2014; Barletta et. Al. 2016; Belyakov, 2015; Buesseler, 2014; Fujita et al., 2012; 
IBRD, 2012; IRSN, 2012; MHLW, 2013; Nomura and Hokugo 2013; WHO, 2013]. Japanese 
agriculture, food industry and agri-food consumption have been among the worst hit areas 
[Bachev and Ito, 2014, 2018; FAO/IAEA, 2018; Hamada and Ogino, 2012; JFC, 2011-2014; 
Johnson, 2011; Koyama, 2013; Kunii et al., 2018; Monma et al., 2015; Nakanishi and Tanoi, 
2013; Nakanishi, 2018; Oka, 2012; Sekizawa, 2013; Todo et al., 2015; Ujiie, 2012; Watanabe, 
2013]. This study tries to assess preparedness for and long-term agri-food impacts of the 
Fukushima nuclear disaster, identify challenges in post-disaster recovery and reconstruction, 
and withdraw lessons for improving disaster risk management in Japan and around the globe.  
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2. Preparedness and Agri-food Impacts Assessment 
The agri-food sector of Japan was not well prepared for such a big disaster and it has been 
badly affected by the accident. The adverse long-term effects on agriculture, food industries 
and food consumption have been in a number of directions: 
First, enormous production and income reduction due to radiation contamination, (mandatory 
and voluntary) shipment restrictions, increased input supply, production and marketing costs, 
higher costs for adaptation and implementation of new safety standards, and diminished market 
demands and prices of farm and agri-food products. Almost 55% of the Japanese farms reported 
they were affected negatively by the triple disaster [JFC, 2013]. In the worst hit Iwate, Miyagi, 
Fukushima, Ibaraki, Tochigi, Gunma, and Chiba prefectures almost 90% all farms suffered as 
“prices decline” and “harmful rumors” pointed as the main reason for the negative impact. The 
annual loss of income from the nuclear accident in Fukushima prefecture alone is estimated to 
be around 100 billion JPY [MAFF, 2013]. Damages to agriculture have been particularly big 
in areas around the Fukushima nuclear plant, where farming and related activity has been 
suspended or significantly reduced. Implemented evacuation zone comprises 8% of the total 
number of farmers and 9% of agricultural lands of Fukushima prefecture [MAFF, 2012]. What 
is more, the effective resumption of operations in mostly affected by the GEJE Iwate, Miyagi 
and Fukushima prefectures is deterred by the impact of nuclear accident, unavailable arable 
land, facilities and equipment, undecided place of settlement, and funding problems [MAFF, 
2015]. What is more the importance of the nuclear crisis as a factor for “not resuming farming” 
has increased. Similarly, 58% of the food companies in Japan were severely affected by the 
Fukushima disaster due to canceled orders, reduced demands, sales and prices, and increased 
costs of input supply, including 82% of the companies in Northern Kanto and Eastern Tohoku, 
and 94% in Fukushima prefecture [JFC, 2014]. A year after the accident less than 50% of the 
pre-disasters operations were reported in around 48% of the affected companies.  
Second, there has been radioactive contamination of farmlands, agrarian assents and important 
infrastructure from the nuclear accident’s fallout (Map 1). Long-lived radioactive cesium has 
contaminated 30,000 km2 or around 8% of the land surface of Japan as almost 40% of it with 
radiation exceeding official allowable level [MECSST, 2011]. Heavily contaminated areas are 
located in 101 municipalities of 8 prefectures as farmlands contamination with cesium ranges 
from 16 to 56,600 Bq/kg [MAFF, 2013]. There have been huge public and private costs 
associated with cleaning of farmlands and other agrarian assets. In Fukushima prefectures the 
restoration of farming operations has been progressing slowly while some heavily 
contaminated areas would require a long time before farming resumes [MAFF, 2017]. 
Agriculture and agri-business have been a major employer for family and non-family labor in 
the affected regions, and after the accident a great number of workers lost temporary or 
permanently employment (and income) opportunities in these important sectors. Furthermore, 
many farms livelihood and businesses have been severely destructed as a result of loss of lives, 
injuries and displacement, and considerable damages on property (farmland, crops, livestock, 
homes, material assets, intangibles such as established brands, good reputation, etc.), related 
infrastructure, and community and business relations. Therefore, much of the overall damages 
from the Fukushima nuclear disaster on farmers’ livelihood and possessions, physical and 
mental health, environment, lost community relations etc. can hardly be evaluated in 
quantitative terms [Bachev and Ito, 2013]. 
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Map 1. Farmlands radioactive contamination in Japan, 2011 
 
 
Third, up to the Fukushima nuclear plant accident there had been no adequate system for agri-
food radiation regulation and inspection to guarantee food safety in the country [MAFF, 2011]. 
Immediately after the nuclear accident the government introduced Provisional regulatory limits 
for radionuclides in agri-food products, while in 2012 food safety standards were upgraded to 
the world’s strictest. Widespread inspections on radiation contamination have been introduced, 
and numerous (mandatory and voluntary) production, shipment and consumption restrictions 
on agri-food products imposed. Regular vigorous radiation tests are carried out on a great 
number of agri-food products in 17 vulnerable prefectures, including all rice bags produced in 
Fukushima prefecture. There have also emerged many private and collective inspections 
systems introduced by farmers and rural associations, food processors, retailers, local 
authorities, consumer organizations, independent agents etc. some employing stricter than 
official food safety norms. There are still a number of products from contaminated areas of 17 
prefectures, which are subject to mandatory or voluntary shipment restrains (outside 
Fukushima they mostly cover mushrooms, wild plants, and fish). As a result of undertaken 
measures, the number of agri-food items with level exceeding the official safety standards 
diminished to zero in all groups but mushrooms and wild plants, fishery products, and wild 
bird and animal meat (Table 1). Modernization of the food safety system in Japan has taken 
some time, and it has been associated with enormous public and private concerns, debates and 
costs. 
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Table 1. Ratio of inspected agricultural products in Japan exceeding official safety limit 
(%) 
Items FY2011 FY2016 
1. Rice 2,2 0 
2. Vegetables 3 0 
3. Fruits 7,7 0 
4. Legume 2,3 0 
5. Tea 8,6 0 
6. Raw milk 0,4 0 
7. Beef 1,3 0 
8. Pork, poultry and 
eggs 
0,7 0 
9. Mushrooms and wild 
plants 
20,2 0,7 
10. Fishery products 17,2 0,1 
11. Wild bird and 
animal meat 
62,4 22,1 
Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare 
Fourth, in the days after the nuclear disaster there was destruction of supply of potable water, 
foods and other necessities in most affected regions [MAFF, 2011]. Unprecedented for modern 
history of Japan food shortages was prevailing across the disaster areas and big cities like 
Tokyo. “Normal” food supply to all affected people was quickly restored and important 
infrastructure (production and storage facilities, wholesale markets, transportation network, 
etc.) rebuilt. Nevertheless, there have been numerous restrictions on production, sells, 
shipments and consumption of basic agri-food products in the affected regions which stopped, 
delayed or significantly reduced the effective supply of a great range of local products (Figure 
1). Furthermore, due to genuine or perceived health risk many consumers stop buying 
agricultural, fishery and food products originated from “Northern Honshu”. Even in cases when 
it was proven that food is safe some wholesale traders, processors and consumers restrain 
buying products from the contaminated areas [MAFF, 2012]. That was a result of lack of 
sufficient capabilities in the inspection system, inappropriate restrictions (initially covering all 
shipments in a prefecture rather than from contaminated localities), revealed rare incidences of 
contamination in commonly safe origins, low confidence in the official “safety” limits and 
inspections, lack of good communication, harmful rumors (“Fu-hyo”), or not authentic 
character of traded products [Bachev and Ito, 2018]. The “reputation damage” has been 
particularly important for many traditional farm produces (rice, fruits, vegetables, mushrooms, 
milk, butter, beef, etc.) from the worst affected regions which demand and prices significantly 
declined [Koyama, 2013]. Demands for Fukushima, Ibaraki and Northern Honshu purchase 
agri-food products have been recovering but still a good proportion of consumers select the 
region of agro-food products buying “rarely” or “not at all” from the affected regions because 
“worry about safety” [JFC, 2014]. Many concern consumers continue to disbelieve in the 
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existing inspection system and employ other ways to procure safe food – direct sales, sales 
contracts, origins, imports, etc.  
Figure 1. Purchase of foodstuffs produced in areas affected by Great East Japan 
Earthquake (including eating out), 2014 
 
Fifth, the nuclear accident has adversely affected international trade as 40 countries imposed 
restrictions on agri-food import from Japan, including major importer such China, United 
States, Indonesia, Malaysia and South Korea. Gradually many countries eased import 
restrictions from Japan but still keeping restrictions for products from Fukushima prefecture as 
radioactive test certificates are required [MAFF, 2017]. 
Sixth, the 2011 disasters have some positive effects on agri-food sector as well especially for 
some farmers and agri-businesses from non-contaminated regions which saw their prices, 
demands, production and sales opportunities increased. Furthermore, there has been a boom in 
technological, product and organizational innovations, and growth of new sectors such as 
radiation testing, decontamination, energy saving, renewable (solar, wind, biofuel) energy, 
nuclear safety, debris cleaning, processing and disposal, research and development, robotics, 
ITC, no-soil and solar sharing farming etc. with huge investments of leading players and state, 
numerous new comers, joint ventures, etc. All they created new employment and income 
opportunities in the affected regions and around the country. 
According to the leading experts in the area the major factors for long-term persistence of the 
nuclear accident’s negative impacts on agriculture are: consumers’ unwillingness to buy, long 
time required for deactivating radiation, insufficient support from the central government, low 
prices of produce, low confidence in official information, lack of information, bad reputation, 
and little preparedness of public authorities [Bachev and Ito, 2018]. The most important factors 
for sustaining of the negative impacts of the nuclear disaster on food industries are: lack of 
information, consumers’ unwillingness to buy, long time required for deactivating radiation, 
little preparedness of public authorities, bad reputation, insufficient support from the central 
government, and low confidence in official information. The most important factors for the 
persistence of negative impacts of the nuclear disaster on food consumption are: lack of 
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information, low confidence in official information, insufficient support from the central 
government, and bad reputation. 
Figure 2. Factors for persistence of agrarian negative impacts of Fukushima nuclear 
disaster (%) 
 
Source: Experts assessment 2017 
3. Major Challenges in Disaster Recovery 
After the nuclear disaster a large scale evacuation affecting almost 9% of Fukushima prefecture 
population was carried out. Despite that evacuation areas and number of evacuees gradually 
decreased (Map 2) the “evacuation designated zones” still covers 371 km2 (2,7% of territory 
of Fukushima prefecture) while nearly 45000 Fukushima residents (2,4% of total) continue to 
live as evacuees, including 75% in other prefectures [FPG, 2018].  
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Map 2. Evacuation zones in 2011 and 2018 
 
 
Source: Fukushima Prefectural Government 
Evacuation and reconstruction have been associated with number of challenges: failure for 
timely evacuation from certain highly contaminated areas, slow response of authorities, lack of 
sufficient public information in the first stages of the disaster, mistrust to public and private 
institutions, multiple displacements of many evacuees, divided communities and families, bad 
communication between different organizations, lack of financial resources, insufficient 
manpower and building materials, ineffective use of public funds, discrimination toward some 
evacuees, emotional conflicts between evacuees (about “self-evacuation”, compensations, 
rebuilding modes), insufficient and unequal compensation, unequal decontamination and 
economic recovery of individual sectors (fast of construction industry, slow for farming, 
services, food processing and fishery) and regions (much slower for Fukushima), workers 
moving away from agriculture and fishery, unequal payment for work in traditional local 
industries and government’s emergency employment program, substandard labor conditions 
for decontamination workers, increased number of individual and organized criminal cases, 
population decline due to out-migration, long-time to obtain local consent for reconstruction 
plans, problems for attracting contractors, difficulties of land acquisition for building cities, 
spikes in construction material prices and manpower shortages, and lack of contractors, 
numerous lawsuits against TEPCO  and authorities, delay in establishing the Reconstruction 
Agency (February 2012) for coordinating multiple recovery efforts in affected areas, lack of 
clear government guidelines for the nuclear disaster recovery, revisions in national energy, 
disaster prevention etc. policies, lack of detailed contamination map for all affected agricultural 
lands, using extension officers in affected areas for obtaining samples for monitoring tests 
while suppressing their ability of consulting, introducing technology, and educating in areas of 
production badly needed, etc. [Bachev and Ito, 2018]. By end 2014 about 70% of monitored 
58 municipalities in 7 prefectures completed or almost completed decontamination, remaining 
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failed to meet deadline as 12 towns sought extensions up to 3 years while certain heavily 
contaminated areas stayed untouched. 
Many evacuees, especially younger generation, refuse to return back even after 
decontamination is completed because of the persisting high radiation in forests around houses 
and existing hot spots, health risk, destructed business and community infrastructure (shops, 
schools, medical facilities), established life and business in other areas, etc. Major reasons for 
the slow progress are: delayed reconstruction, a slow pace of lands decontamination, existing 
hotspots, restricted mobility in evacuated areas, calls for more decontamination, difficulties in 
safe disposal of contaminated soil and debris, population fears regarding radiation hazards, 
concern about safety of intermediate nuclear waste storage facility, lack of job opportunities, 
destructed business, unrestored critical services and infrastructure, absence of communities 
consensus for certain projects, uncertainty for future developments, etc. 
Insufficient decontamination of farmland and irrigation canals, decreased motivation among 
farmers, and local anxiety over rumors about contaminated produce are major reasons for low 
resumption rate of farming in the evacuation zone. It has been also difficult to farm efficiently 
(e.g. water control in paddy fields) since farmers were not allowed to stay permanently, there 
has been uncertainty associated with marketing of output (high contamination, consumer 
unwillingness to buy), and radioactive water runoff from mountains to reservoirs and paddy 
fields. 
Improved food safety measures have let the Fukushima agri-food products to become one of 
“most secure in the world”. Nevertheless, enormous public and private actions to increase 
safety and transparency measures, and huge promotion campaigns, have not recover consumer 
trust. Demand for agri-food products from the affected region in Japan and internationally stays 
low. “Reputation damage” persists due to the lack of sufficient capabilities in inspection 
system, inappropriate restrictions (initially covering all shipments in a prefecture rather than 
from contaminated localities), revealed rare incidences of contamination in commonly safe 
origins, low confidence in official “safety” limits and inspections, lack of good communication, 
harmful rumors, not authentic character of traded products, etc. Demands for Fukushima, 
Ibaraki and Northern Honshu agricultural products has been recovering fast while the farm-
gate and wholesale prices lower than in the other parts of the country. That is a consequence 
of the increased number of inspections, reduction of radioactive contaminations, improving 
consumer confidence on inspection and safety, “forgetting” contamination issue by some part 
of population, preferences to lower prices regardless quality by some consumers, changing 
marketing strategies of processors and smaller shops (not promoting/labeling anymore some 
products as “Fukushima origin”), increasing procurement by restaurants and processors from 
the region, etc.  
There have a number of challenges with the present safety inspection system. Due to the lack 
of personnel, expertise, and high-precision equipment, the water, food and soil tests have not 
always been accurate, consistent and comprehensive. Very expensive high-precision 
instruments are not available everywhere to measure lower radiation levels set up by the new 
regulation (detecting single-digit levels in water, food). Food safety inspections are basically 
carried out at distribution stage (output for shipment or export), and do not (completely) cover 
produces for farmers’ markets, direct sells, food exchanges and self-consumption. Capability 
for radiation safety control in Fukushima prefecture is high while in other prefectures strict 
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tests are not carried out at all and contamination has “no administrative borders”. Many of 
privately and collective testing equipment are not with high precision, and/or samples are 
properly prepared for analysis by inexperienced farmers. There are considerable discrepancies 
in measurements of radiation levels (air, food) done by different entities in a specific location. 
Consequently, certain sold and consumed products are labeled as safe despite contamination. 
Some tested agricultural products are further cooked or dried reaching higher levels of radiation 
during consumption.  
Agri-food inspections, regulations and countermeasures are conducted in vertically segmented 
administrations with “own” policies and not (well)coordinated procedures - soil contamination 
surveys and inspection of agricultural produce by MAFF, monitoring of air radiation levels by 
MECSST, regulations on food safety standards and value determination by MHLW, 
decontamination and waste disposal by ME, training associated with food safety by CAA, and 
restoration and decontamination by RA. There are no common procedures and standards, nor 
effective coordination between monitoring carried out at different levels and by different 
organizations (national, prefectural, municipal, farmers, business, research). Neither there is a 
common framework for centralizing and sharing all related information and making it available 
to interested parties and public.  
Officially applied “area based” system for shipment restrictions is harming many farmers 
producing safe commodities, instead of area-wide blanket lifting a permit shipment by selected 
farmers would be more appropriate. System extending random sampling tests of circulating 
produce (shipment level) with management/control at production “planning” stage is 
suggested. According to most agents the biggest hurdle is the lack of a clear radiation risk 
standard that can be universally accepted. There have been on-going discussions among experts 
about “safety limits” and lack of agreement confuses producers and consumers.  
Another challenge of inspection system is the costs for local authorities, farmers, food industry, 
etc. Fukushima prefectural government maintains the number of tested items, funding is 
expected to deplete while the central government decreases screened items number. Much of 
testing inspection costs of cooperatives, farmers, food processors etc. are not compensated. 
There a challenges with emerging new technologies and organizational modes – for plant 
factories they are high building and running costs, difficulties in cultivation technique, human 
development, food certification system (fertilizers are used to water), needs for stable 
marketing through integration, etc. New organization forms usually require entrepreneurship, 
collective actions (lands consolidation, cooperation), big investment, taking over by non-
agrarian capital/entities, which are not always available, well-accepted or legitimate. 
Another challenge is the health risk for population caused by radiation exposure. Thanks to the 
timely undertaken measures (warnings, protection, evacuation, monitoring, decontamination, 
food inspections, treatment), radiation levels for the general population have been well below 
the norms required to damage health. Latest air dose rates around the country and within critical 
places in Fukushima prefecture is higher than before disaster but comparable with major cities 
overseas [FPG, 2018]. Surveys in most affected regions indicate that the annual radiation 
intakes from foods have been less than 1% of the maximum allowed and decreasing over time 
[MHLW, 2018]. 
  
11 
 
In 2011 the official “safe” radiation exposure levels were drastically increased from 1 mSv to 
20 mSv per year. There have been debates and great concerns about the health effects from 
cumulative exposure above and within official limit. That worries are enforced by the 
controversial opinions of experts, slow process of decontamination in some areas and 
ecosystems, unresolved issue with safe disposal of contaminated debris in certain areas, 
deficiency of the food safety control systems, continuing radiation leakages in the nuclear plant. 
Since the accident complains and hospitalization has been increasing in Fukushima prefecture 
[Bachev and Ito, 2018]. It is believed that health effects of the radiation release are “primarily 
psychological rather than physical”. Many consumers and producers “lose peace of mind” 
having food with (lower than official safety limit but nevertheless) radiation contamination. 
Uptake of radioactive materials with food by local residents increases during summer season 
when mostly fresh vegetables and fruits are consumed. Despite “safe” level cooking and drying 
of some ingredients also increases radiation concentration. Besides, there are untested wild 
plants or home produced food widely consumed by locals. Long periods of evacuee life, lost 
property and employment have caused many people to grow isolated or develop physical or 
mental (stress, anxiety) problems. “Disaster related deaths” are also growing reaching several 
thousands, majority being from Fukushima prefecture. Nevertheless, it is becoming 
increasingly difficult to identify relationships between health problems/deaths and nuclear 
accident due to the long period of time.  
Since October 2011 by end of March 2018, TEPCO paid more than ¥8 trillion in compensation 
related to Fukushima accident, half to individuals and another one to businesses [Brasor and 
Tsubuku, 2018]. Payouts officially ended but there are thousands individual and collective 
claimants seeking or disputing compensations from TEPCO or authorities through court or 
other ways. Estimated amount of compensation has been growing up each time the 
governmental panel issues new guidelines. Number of false claims and swindling 
compensation funds for millions of yens are also reported. 
Progress in compensation payments has been slow and uneven due to delays in TEPCO’s 
review process, demands for further documentation, lack of sufficient funds, multiple disputes, 
etc. Major problems related to compensation in agri-food sectors are: great paper works; 
lengthily negotiation; delays in payments; not paying full amount claimed; disputing accident 
origin of damages; denying claims when production and distribution are restrained voluntarily; 
farmland, farming property and discontinuation of business damage uncompensated; 
disagreements over compensation “closing date; insufficient amount to restart farming or 
sustain consumption; inspection, administrative, radiation map preparation, etc. costs of 
organizations not compensated; support for damages not clearly specified in guidelines; 
negotiation asymmetry for farmers who did not market through cooperatives; high lawyers 
costs; “safety tests” costs of farmers and consumer associations not compensated; lack of 
clarity how certain claims will be compensated; cash-flow difficulties and interest payments; 
uniform compensation “per 10 are” while differences in amount of products, discrepancies in 
method (organic, conventional), unlike value added of produce, etc. 
Furthermore, there is still uncertainty about the full costs related to the nuclear accident since 
their level has been expanding constantly. Initial government estimates (2014) were that it 
would take ¥11.16 trillion and 40 years to clean up the Fukushima site, including 2,5 trillion 
for decontamination, 1,1 trillion for interim storage facilities, 2 trillion for reactor 
decommissioning and contaminated water treatment, and 5 trillion for compensation from 
  
12 
 
TEPCO. In 2018 compensation payments are already more than ¥8 trillion while budget for 
decontamination ¥2.9 trillion [ME, 2018]. Process of decommissioning the nuclear reactors is 
at the beginning stage and associated with many challenges - lack of experiences, available 
technologies, uncertainties and risks, failures, public concerns, lack of disposal site, etc.  
For a long-period generated during decontamination soil, leafs, mud, and other radioactive 
waste amounting 16-22 mil.m3 has been stored in thousands “temporary” storage sites across 
Fukushima and 12 other prefectures [ME, 2018]. “Designated waste” containing radioactive 
substances measuring more than 8000 Bq/kg is 143,689 tons. New temporary (up to 30 years) 
storage facilities for radioactive waste near the nuclear plant operates since 2017 where merely 
513 m3 are transported. A site for the final disposal of radioactive waste outside of Fukushima 
prefecture has not been chosen yet since local residents strongly oppose to construction of 
facilities - fears about radiation, environmental threat, risk that agro-products will become 
unsellable. 
After the nuclear accident all 54 nuclear reactors in Japan were shut down for stress tests and 
complying to new (2013) world’s strictest safety standards. Until 2018 only 5 nuclear plants (9 
reactors) resumed operations due to lack of readiness, uncompleted formal procedures and 
strong opposition by local governments and communities. Consequently, experts find official 
estimates “over-optimistic” predicting that nuclear disaster costs will increase further and 
become as high as national annual tax -  ¥43 trillion [Okuyama, 2014].  
Government report points out that the release of radioactive materials following the Fukushima 
nuclear accident remains Japan's biggest environmental problem. According to some experts 
undertaken large-scale decontamination creates new environmental problems such as: huge 
amounts of radioactive waste, removal of top soil, damage to wildlife habitat and soil fertility, 
increased erosion on scraped bare hillsides and forests, and intrusion by people and machinery 
into every ecosystem scheduled for remediation. All these difficulties and uncertainties make 
it difficult to access the full environmental impact nuclear disaster, and require a long-term 
monitoring and actions [ME, 2018]. 
4. Lessons from Japanese experiences 
There are a number of lessons that can be learned from the assessment of agri-food sector 
readiness, impacts and recovery from the nuclear disaster in Japan: 
• Triple March 2011 disaster was a rare but a high impact event, which came as a 
“surprise” even for a country with frequent natural disasters and well-developed disaster risk 
management system like Japan. It is necessary to “prepare for unexpected”, and design, build 
and test a multi-hazard disaster risk management for the specific conditions of each country, 
region, sector, etc. Appropriate measures and sufficient resources (funding, personnel, stock 
piles, shelter cites, transportation means) have to be planned for effective prevention, early 
warning, mitigation, response, and post disaster relief and recovery from big disasters and 
accidents. Besides state resources it is important to mobilize huge private, community, NGOs, 
and international capabilities, expertise and means – e.g. a public-private partnership is 
necessary to properly identify and designate available public and private resources 
(accommodations for a longer stay, relief supply, etc.) in case a big disaster occurs and 
evacuation needs arise. 
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• Risk assessment is to include diverse (health, dislocation, economic, behavioral, 
ecological, etc.) hazards and complementary (food, supply, natural, biological) chain, spin offs, 
and multilateral effects of a likely (natural, manmade, combined) disaster. Modern methods 
and technologies are to be widely employed (mass and social networks, computer simulation, 
satellite imaging) for effective communication, preparation of disaster maps, assessment of 
likely impacts, planning of evacuation routs, relief needs, and recovery measures, secure debris 
and waste management, etc. It is crucial to involve multidisciplinary and multi-stakeholders’ 
teams in all stages of risk management to guarantee a holistic approach, “full” information and 
transparency, adequate assessment of risks, preferences and capabilities, and maximum 
efficiency. 
• Risk management system is to be discussed with all stakeholders, and measures taken 
to educate and train individuals, organizations and communities for complex disasters and all 
contingencies. Individual responsibilities are to be well-specified and effective mechanisms for 
coordination of actions of authorities, organizations, and groups at different levels put in place 
and tested to ensure efficiency (speed, lack of duplication and gaps) during emergency. 
Individual and small-scale operators dominate in the agri-food sector of most countries around 
the world, and their proper information, training, and involvement is critical. The latter is to 
embrace diverse agri-food and rural organizations, consumers, and population of each age 
group, which all commonly have no disaster management “culture”, knowledge, training, and 
plans (particularly for large disasters like earthquakes, tsunamis, nuclear and industrial 
accidents). 
• It is necessary to modernize the specific and overall formal institutional environment 
(property rights, regulations, safety standards, norms) according to the needs of contemporary 
disaster risk management. A particular attention is to be put on updating agri-food safety, labor, 
health, and animal welfare standards, and ensure adequate mechanisms, qualified agents, and 
technical instruments for effective implementation and enforcement. Agri-food inspection 
system is to be improved by creating uniform inspection manuals and standards, enhancing 
coordination and avoiding duplication between different organizations, establishing inspection 
framework prefectural borders, and management system extending random sampling tests of 
marketed produce with management and control at production “planning” stage.  
• It is important to set up mechanisms to improve efficiency of public resource allocation, 
avoid mismanagement and misuse of resources as well as reduce individual agents’ costs for 
complying with regulations and using public relief, support and dispute resolution (e.g. court) 
system. That would let efficient allocation of limited social resources according to agents needs 
and preferences, intensify and speed up transactions, improve enforcement (of rights, laws, 
standards) and conflict resolution, decrease corruption, and eventually accelerate recovery and 
reconstruction. It is obligatory to involve all stakeholders in decision-making and control, 
increase transparency etc. at all levels and stages of disaster planning, management, and 
reconstruction. In case of evacuation, it is essential to secure proper (police, voluntary group) 
protection of private and public properties from thefts and wild animal invasion in disaster and 
evacuation zones. 
• Different agents and elements of agri-food chain are affected unlikely from a disaster 
and have dissimilar capability to recover. Most farming assets (multiannual crops, irrigation 
facilities, building, brands, biodiversity, landscape) are interlinked with land, and if land is 
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damaged a rapid recovery (rebuilding, relocation, alternative supply) is very costly or 
impossible. Smaller-scale and highly specialized enterprises, small-member communities and 
organizations, visitors and tourists to disaster regions, are more vulnerable and have less ability 
to protect, bear consequences and recover. All that require differential public support 
(intervention, compensation, funding, assistance) to various types of agents it order to provide 
emergency relief, accelerate recovery and diminish negative long-term consequences.  
• There is a strong “regional” specificity (interdependency) of agrarian, food and other 
rural assets. If a part of assets/products is damaged or affected (e.g. destruction of critical 
transportation, communication, distribution, electricity and water supply infrastructure; 
nuclear, chemical, pathogen etc. contamination) the negative externalities impact all agents in 
respective region (including undamaged lands, livestock, produce, services). In order to 
minimize damages, it is important to properly identify (locate) risk and take prevention 
measures, recover rapidly critical infrastructure, strictly enforce quality (safety, authenticity, 
origin) of products and adequately communicate them to all interested parties (producers, 
processors, distributors, consumers, international community). 
• Establishment of accessible cooperative, quasi-public or public agricultural (crop, 
livestock, machineries, building, life and health) insurance system, including assurance against 
big natural, nuclear etc. disasters is very important for rapid recovery of affected agents and 
sectors. Modernization of the out of dated (often informal) lands, material, biological and 
intellectual property registration and valorization system is important for effective post disaster 
compensation, recovery and reconstruction. That is particularly true for great number of 
subsistent and “semi-market” holdings dominating the agro-food sector around the globe, 
which usually suffer significantly from disasters (often losing all possessions) but get no market 
valuation, insurance and/or public support. 
• Specific responses to 2011 disasters have highlighted the comparative advantages of 
traditional communities and non-governmental organizations, and certain less “efficient” but 
more resilient structures (small operators, partnerships) and sectors (one season crops, poultry, 
pig, processing). Important role of small scale farm and food organizations, informal networks 
and leadership has been proven immediately after accident now in rapid agri-food supply, 
securing food safety and transparency, effective (self)recovery, reconstruction, technological 
and organizational innovations, networking, decentralized actions, etc. These governing modes 
have to be included in the disaster management system, relevant actors properly trained and 
appropriate responsibilities assigned. 
• Good management of information and communication is extremely important in 
emergency, recovery, and post disaster reconstruction operations. March 2011 disaster has 
proven that any delay, a partial release or controversies of official information have hampered 
the effective (re)actions of agents, and adversely affected public trust and behavior (e.g. buying 
products from disaster regions). Before, during and after a disaster all available (risk, 
monitoring, measured, projected) information from all reliable sources is to be immediately 
publicized in understandable by everyone form through all possible means (official and 
community channels, mobile phones, social media, etc.). It is essential always to publish 
alternative (independent, private, scientific, international) information, including in foreign 
languages, which would build public trust and increase confidence. In Japan it has not been 
easy to find all available information related to the Match 2011 disasters in a timely and 
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systematized way (updates, diverse aspects, unified measurement, time series, alternative 
sources), which make many foreigners and local skeptical about accuracy. 
• A big disaster often provides extraordinary opportunity to discuss, introduce and 
implement fundamental changes in (agricultural, economic, regional, energy, disaster 
management) policies, improve disaster management and food security, modernize regulation 
and standards, relocate farms and houses, consolidate lands and operations, upgrade 
infrastructure, restructure production and farming organizations, introduce technological and 
business innovation, improve natural environment, etc. All such opportunities are to be 
effectively used by central and local authorities through policies, programs, measures, and 
adequate public support given for all innovative private and collective initiatives. 
• Importance of international cooperation in all areas has been repeatedly proven in post 
disaster recovery, decontamination and reconstruction, etc. through sharing information, 
knowledge, expertise, know-how, specialized equipment, etc. It is particularly crucial to share 
internationally advance Japanese experience through media, visits, studies, conferences, etc. 
and turn Fukushima (Tohoku) in a disaster risk management hub for other regions and 
countries. It is essential not to copy but adapt the positive Japanese experiences to the specific 
(institutional, cultural, natural) environment and risks structure of each community, subsector, 
region, and country. 
• It is important to learn from the past experiences and make sure that “lessons learned” 
are not forgotten. Impacts and factors of a disaster, disaster management, and post disaster 
reconstruction are to be continuously studied, knowledge communicated to public, and 
“transferred” to next generation.  It is critical to share “good” and “bad” experiences with 
disaster prevention, management and recovery with other regions and countries, in order to 
prevent that happening again.  
5. Conclusion 
Almost eight years after Fukushima nuclear disaster there are still a number of challenges 
associated with the recovery and reconstruction in the region and elsewhere. They are mostly 
related with a big number of evacuees with destructed life and businesses, continuing 
outmigration from the badly affected areas, slow pace of rebuilding of devastated 
infrastructure, housings and businesses, prolong decontamination process, on-going crises in 
Fukushima nuclear plant, consumer reluctance to visit and buy products of affected regions, 
etc. Speed and extent of disaster recovery and post-disaster reconstruction differ quite 
substantially among individual agents, (sub)sectors, and (sub)regions. Besides, there are great 
uncertainties associated with the long-term social, health, economic, environmental, policy etc. 
consequences of the nuclear disaster. 
Agriculture, food industry and food consumption have been among the worst hit by the 
disasters areas. Agri-food sectors of Fukushima, Miyagi and Iwate prefectures have been 
particularly severely affected in the short and longer term. There are also significant adverse 
consequences on other (neighboring) regions and entire food chains at a larger (regional, 
national, international) scale.  
There is a great variation of the specific impacts of the nuclear disaster on different type of 
farming and business enterprises (small-big scale, specialized, diversified, integrated), 
particular agents (producers, processors, distributors, consumers, community and public 
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organizations), individual sub-sectors (rice, vegetables, beef), and specific locations 
(evacuation zone, seaside). Moreover, there have been enormous damages and long-term 
consequences on farming and rural households, important properties (farmland, livestock, 
orchards), personal ties, established brands, informal organizations and traditional 
communities. Many of all these negative effects can hardly be adequately expressed in 
quantitative (e.g. monetary) terms. In addition, 2011 disasters have considerably aggravated 
some already existing problems of the agrarian and rural regions such as: aging and shrinking 
population, lack of labor and young entrepreneurs, low competitiveness and efficiency, income 
and services disparities, etc.  
The specific responses to the 2011 disasters have highlighted the comparative advantages of 
traditional communities and non-governmental organizations, and certain less “efficient” but 
more resilient structures, and had positive impacts on development of certain (more resilient, 
adaptive) sectors in most affected regions and some (traditional, prospective) sectors in other 
parts of the country. 
The post disaster recovery and reconstruction have given opportunities and induced 
considerable policies and institutional modernization in agrarian and other (e.g. energy, 
security) sectors, and improve disaster prevention and management, food safety information 
and inspection, technological and product innovation, jobs creation and investment (including 
in “new” areas such as research and innovation, ICT, renewable energy, robotization), 
farmlands consolidation and enhancement, infrastructural amelioration, organizational 
restructuring, etc. 
This study is just a new attempt to assess disaster management readiness, impacts of nuclear 
accident, and lessons for agriculture and food chains. Understandably research is incomplete 
due to the “short” period of time after the disaster, insufficient and controversial data, 
difficulties to adequately assess longer term implications, etc. Therefore, more in depth and 
interdisciplinary studies are necessary to evaluate overall impacts and improve disaster risk 
management system. 
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